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Abstract— Today complex edge services are positioned on the 
Wireless LAN, different cryptographic protocols with complex 
as well as reactive communication models and event 
dependencies are increasingly being specified and adopted. To 
ensure that such protocols (and compositions thereof with 
existing protocols) do not result in unacceptable behaviors (e.g., 
deadlocks or live locks); a methodology is desirable for the 
automated checking of the “correctness” of these protocols. In 
this paper, we present ingredients of such a methodology. 
Specifically, we show how SPIN, a tool used for the formal 
systems verification purposes, can be used to verify as well as 
quickly identify problematic behaviors (if any) in core 
component of emergent Wireless LAN with non trivial 
communication authentication constructs – such as Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) for Transport layer Security 
(TLS).In our analysis, we identify essential elements, model 
and verify the EAP – TLS protocol using SPIN. It will 
evidently provide an insight into the scope and utility of formal 
methods based on state space exploration in testing larger and 
complex systems, for example, the complete Wireless LAN 
authentication suit. 
 Keywords- EAP–TLS, Protocol Engineering, Wireless LAN 
security, Authentication, Communication protocols modeling & 
verification 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Modeling is the process of abstracting the functional 
specifications of a system into a minimal working example 
that enables us to understand and analyze a particular aspect 
of the system more closely. Verification means the process 
of examining this specification for the presence of various 
errors that could lead to improper system operation. There 
are five elements of specifications particularly service part, 
assumption, vocabulary, encoding (format) and  procedure 
rules for a protocol. Spin [16] is a verification system that 
supports the design and verification of finite state 
asynchronous, distributed and concurrent systems. Programs 
are constructed in the PROMELA programming language, 
which is similar to an ordinary programming language, with 
additional non-deterministic specification-based constructs. 
Processes communicate either via shared variables or via 
message passing through buffered channels. Properties to be 
verified are described in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). The 
spin model checker can automatically determine whether a 
program satisfies a property and in case the property does not 
hold, an error trace is generated.  
This paper documents an application of SPIN to model, 
simulate and formally verify an emergent authentication 
protocol for Wireless LAN EAP – TLS  [1, 2, 3] 
authentication Protocol. EAP-TLS is based on an 
authentication protocol that is nearly identical to the protocol 
used in the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [2] version 3.0 for 
securing Web transactions. EAP-TLS provides mutual 
authentication between the client and the authentication 
server. Once authentication is completed, 802.1X enables 
dynamic encryption keys are generated. In EAP-TLS, digital 
certificates are used for mutual authentication. Digital 
certificates can be stored on smart cards or on the client 
computer.  
The organization of this paper is as follows: section 2 
gives the overview of EAP – TLS authentication protocol 
including the evolution history of EAP – TLS; Section 3 
covers four essential elements of a protocol characteristic in 
EAP – TLS; Some related research works are illustrate in 
section 4; Next two sections describe the modeling and 
verification results of EAP–TLS and finally comes the 
conclusion with some future directions.     
II. OVERVIEW OF EAP-TLS 
The EAP protocol provides a framework for IEEE 
802.1X authentication and works in co-operation with Point-
to-Point Protocol (PPP). EAP conducts the actual IEEE 
802.1X authentication procedure and support for a number of 
authentication schemes may be added, including smart cards, 
Kerberos, public key, one-time passwords, and others [3]. 
EAP supports mutual authentication, and since PPP 
encryption protocol assumes existence of a session key, it is 
useful to have a mechanism for session key   establishment. 
Since the design of a secure key management protocol is 
non-trivial, it is desirable to avoid creating new mechanisms 
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for this. The EAP protocol allows a PPP peer to take 
advantage of the protected cipher-suite negotiation, mutual 
authentication and key management capabilities of the TLS 
protocol.  
Transport Level Security (TLS) provides support for 
mutual authentication, integrity-protected cipher-suite 
negotiation and key exchange between two endpoints. EAP – 
TLS uses certificates to carry out the authentication in IEEE 
802.1X networks. EAP–TLS negotiation is based on mutual 
authentication, where both the user and the network 
authenticate each other. 
Both the wireless client and the authentication server 
send their certificates as proof of their identities during the 
authentication procedure. There are two main kinds of digital 
certificates being exchanged, server certificate, and client 
certificate [6, 12]. The network administrator configures the 
client certificate to the client and the server controls the 
validity of the client certificate the network. Likewise, the 
wireless client checks if the authentication server can be 
trusted or not. 
Evolution of EAP-TLS 
The TLS Working Group was established in 1996 to 
standardize a 'transport layer' security protocol. The working 
group began with SSL version 3.0, and in January 1999, 
RFC 2246 [2] TLS Protocol Version 1.0 was published as a 
proposed standard. The working group also published RFC 
2712 in addition to Kerberos cipher-suites for Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) [6] as a proposed standard in October 
1999. Another RFC on PPP EAP – TLS Authentication 
Protocol was published in October 1999 and two RFCs on 
the use of TLS with HTTP in May 2000. 
In June 2003, an RFC 3546 (updated of 2246) on 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension was published.  
In June 2004, RFC 3748 was published as a replacement 
of previous RFC 2284. In this paper, we mainly focused on 
the RFC 2716 PPP EAP–TLS Authentication Protocol. 
Analysis of eap-tls 
The TLS version 1.0 is composed of two layers: the TLS 
Record Protocol and TLS Handshake Protocol. The TLS 
Record Protocol provides connection security consisting 
following features: 
a) The connection is private. Symmetric cryptography is 
used for data encryption (e.g., DES, RC4, etc.) The keys for 
this symmetric encryption are generated uniquely for each 
connection and are based on a secret negotiated by another 
protocol (such as the TLS Handshake Protocol). The Record 
Protocol can also be used without encryption [2]. 
b) The connection is reliable. Message transport includes 
a message integrity checking using a keyed MAC. Secure 
hash functions (SHA, MD5, etc.) are used for MAC 
computations. The Record Protocol can operate without a 
MAC, but is generally used in this mode while another 
protocol is using the Record Protocol as a transport for 
negotiating security parameters. 
The TLS Record Protocol is used for encapsulation of 
various higher-level protocols. One such encapsulated 
protocol, the TLS Handshake   Protocol, allows the server 
and client to authenticate each other and   to negotiate an 
encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys before   the 
application protocol transmits or receives its first byte of   
data. The TLS Handshake Protocol provides connection 
security that   comprises following characteristics:  
   i) The peer's identity can be authenticated using 
asymmetric or public key, cryptography (e.g., RSA, DSS, 
etc.). This authentication can be made optional, but is 
generally required for at least one of the peers.  
   ii) The negotiation of a shared secret is secure. The 
negotiated secret is unavailable to eavesdroppers, and for 
any authenticated connection, even an attacker who can 
place himself in the middle of the connection cannot obtain 
the secret. 
   iii) The negotiation is reliable. No attacker can modify the 
negotiation communication without being detected by the 
parties to the communication. 
EAP – TLS processing model assumes an EAP – TLS 
message originates at an initial authenticator and is sent to 
authenticating peer via zero or more intermediaries. 
We concentrate on modeling and verification of EAP-
TLS authentication model. We briefly present here the four 
elements of its specifications.       
A. Services 
EAP–TLS performs authentication between 
authenticating peer and the authenticator. Therefore, this 
protocol is used for the client server architectural model. 
This allows EAP – TLS to be used in a large variety of 
Wireless LAN for authentication procedure. 
B. Assumptions about the environment 
The environment is which the protocol is to be executed 
consists of an authenticator (access point and EAP 
authentication server) and at least one authenticating peer 
(client). The EAP – TLS protocol starts authenticator with 
the sending request to the authenticator peer for user 
identification. The authenticating peer responds by sending 
the user identification. The EAP – TLS conversation will 
continue until the authentication of both authenticating peer 
and the authenticator is completed. The five major 
assumptions of EAP – TLS authentication processing model 
of messaging framework in this paper are: 
    a) EAP–Request/ EAP – Respond is sent to an 
Authenticating Peer /Authenticator via zero intermediaries. 
    b) Lower Layer [3] of this protocol handles message 
corruption and disruption. 
    c) Message fragmentation mechanism need not be 
considered.  
   d) Each message contains a sequence number r = (r+1) % 
message_range. 
   e) A new session will be always established after 
successful authentication. 
C. Protocol vocabulary 
According to [1], an EAP – TLS message is an ordinary 
packet containing the following fields: “Code” identifies the 
type of the message EAP – Request/ EAP –Response. 
“Identifier” aids in matching responses with requests. 
“Length” is the total length of the packet. In addition, the 
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“Data” field contains one or more TLS record.  In the EAP – 
TLS authentication, different types of messages like request 
identity, response identity, credential request, credential 
response, TLS change, TLS reply, TLS alert, EAP success 
and EAP failure are passed between the authenticating peer 
and the authenticator. Each message is placed in the data 
field of packet as TLS record. The credential request and the 
credential response contain multiple messages. 
C.1  The Credential request:   The credential request is 
placed on the data field of EAP – Request packet and sends 
by the authenticator. This will contain a TLS server 
hello_handshake message which is a response of client_hello 
handshake message, possibly followed by the authenticator’s 
TLS certificate, server_key_exchange, client_certificate 
request and finished_handshake.  
C.2  The Credential Response: The credential response is 
also placed on the data field of EAP – Response packet and 
sends by the authenticating peer. This will contain the 
client’s TLS certificate, client_key_exchange, authenticator 
certificate_verify, change_cipher_spec and TLS finished.   
D. Procedure Rules 
The EAP – TLS authentication processing model 
specifies how the conversation between the authenticating 
peer and authenticator take place. Various types of messages 
exchange between them during authentication process. The 
EAP – TLS authentication process model itself doesn’t 
maintain any state but performs correlation and coordination 
between messages. Even for example, during authentication 
process authenticator sends multiple requests to the peer and 
receives multiple responses. Each subsequent request 
depends on the response of pervious request. It is the 
responsibility of authenticator and authenticating peer to 
define such combined processing. Figure 1 and 2 
demonstrate the message flow between authenticator and 
authenticating peer. 
III. RELATED WORK 
There have been a number of attempts to model & verify 
the security of cryptographic protocols. Abadi & Needham 
[5] presented a set of design principles, assumed over the 
years, to aid protocol designers in creating more robust 
protocols. In [6], the concept of secure cryptographic 
protocols has been discussed. According to that paper all 
assumptions about the environment must be explicitly 
defined like Bellare and Rogaway’s work [7]. We have 
followed this principle in our research. 
Protocol modeling & verification are conducted using 
two approaches: (a) the conventional method in which a 
series of tests will be applied to the simulation model and (b) 
formal verification techniques that will allow us to establish 
safety and liveness properties with respect to the verification 
model. For this purpose Estelle, SDL, Verilog, LOTOS, Petri 
Nets, etc methodologies & tools are used [7]. To minimize 
the effort in obtaining the verification model from the 
simulation model, Promela language that is close to 
conventional programming languages has been used in this 
research. The Promela verifier, SPIN, is one of the most 
widely distributed finite-state protocol verifier in use today. 
Extensive work has been carried out with its help, both in 
industrial and academic areas. Theoretical advancements and 
practical experiences are continuously reported in the 
proceedings of the International Spin Workshops. For 
example, in [8], the analysis of GPRS radio interface 
protocols and UMTS radio connection establishment 
procedures were discussed, which resulted in a very concise 
and provably correct specification of the essential signaling 
exchange. 
IV. SIMULATION & VERIFICATION RESULTS 
After constructing the code in XSPIN environment [16], 
we run the simulation. The simulation output and message 
sequence chart are shown in Figure 3. 
A. Correctness 
We would like to prove that correct implementations of 
the model acting in all combinations of roles are well 
behaved, by which we mean that the rules of the protocol 
prevent the system from entering undesirable states such as 
deadlock (all agents blocked waiting for others to act) or live 
lock (agents interacting in a way that produces no 
“progress”). Alternatively correctness properties can be 
expressed as a) properties of reachable states (Safety) and as 
properties of sequences of states (Liveness). 
Checking ‘Safety’ comprises two things: (1) checking 
local process assertions and invariants (if any), and (2) 
checking proper termination points of progress (end state 
levels – if any). 
Validating ‘Liveness’ comprises (1) looking for 
acceptance cycles, (2) looking for non-progress cycles, (3) 
using 'never' claims – which defines an observer process that 
executes synchronously with the system, and (4) trace 
assertions – to reason about valid or invalid sequences of 
send or receive statements. 
We have used the major 'never' claim here as follows. It 
represents messages will eventually accepted by the 
Authenticating Peer whenever it comes from the 
Authenticator.  
    The following LTL claim us used: 
never{ 
do 
:: !Authenticating_peer@start ->break 
od 
} 
The result of ‘Bit State Search’ and ‘Exhaustive Search’ 
are illustrated in table 1. 
From the verification results, hash factor is very large 
(>100). It means we are confident of sufficient coverage. All 
the validation runs confirms that correctness requirements of 
EAP – TLS authentication protocol are properly met. 
However, if all messages sent by the ‘Authenticating 
Peer’ are lost, an acceptance cycle will be detected, meaning 
that the never claim is matched. 
TABLE I.  BIT STATE AND EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH RESULT OF 
MESSAGING FRAMEWORK 
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Bit State Search Exhaustive Search 
 (Spin Version 4.1.2 -- 21 
February 2004) 
+ Partial Order Reduction 
 
Bit statespace search for: 
     never claim             
+ 
     assertion violations
 + 
                           (if within 
scope of claim) 
     acceptance   cycles 
 +    
         (fairness disabled) 
     invalid end states
 -  
         (disabled by never 
claim) 
State-vector 32 byte, 
depth reached 0, errors: 
0 
       1 states, stored 
       0 states, matched 
       1 transitions  
           (= 
stored+matched) 
       0 atomic steps 
Hash factor: 
2.09715e+06 (expected 
coverage: >= 99.9% on 
avg.) 
(max size 2^22 states) 
 
(Spin Version 4.1.2 -- 21 
February 2004) 
    + Partial Order 
Reduction 
 
Full statespace search for:
        never claim         
 + 
        assertion violations
 +  
                (if within scope 
of claim) 
         non-progress cycles 
 +  
                 (fairness 
disabled) 
         invalid end states
  -  
                 (disabled by 
never claim) 
State-vector 32 byte, 
depth reached 35, errors: 
0 
      36 states, stored (49 
visited) 
      26 states, matched 
      75 transitions (= 
visited+matched) 
       0 atomic steps 
hash conflicts: 0 
(resolved) 
(max size 2^18 states) 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have modeled the Messaging 
Framework of EAP – TLS authentication protocol and 
verified it using SPIN. We have also identified the five 
parameters of this protocol part. Now, we are confirming that 
this protocol meets all the validation, requirements and 
works properly. 
Our future work will concentrate upon the scope and 
utility of formal methods based on state space exploration in 
testing large & complex system scalable to the complete 
Wireless LAN authentication suit. It will evidently identify 
the security holes in probable inter – protocol exchange 
framework of Wireless LAN. 
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Figure 1: Authenticating Peer Process                  Figure 2: Authenticator Process 
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